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11 Introduction
The World Trade Organization (WTO) set up rules that allow governments
to protect domestic producers from foreign competition if the competitor sells
goods on the domestic market below a “fair price” according to WTO rules.
This rule is intended to protect against unfair competition and predation
that may harm local industry.
Article VI has recently been the subject of public criticism. In The Econo-
mist it is argued that “this right [to protect against goods that are sold below
cost] is often misused as a tool of naked protection, particularly by Ameri-
ca”1. This criticism is shared by many economists. Nobel laureate Joseph
E. Stiglitz on several occasions has pointed out that anti-dumping legislation
has mainly been used as a means of protecting producers in industrialized
countries from competition by producers in emerging economies.2 Bhagwati
(1988, p. 48) considers the data on anti-dumping cases and draws the conclu-
sion that “... the dramatic rise of such unfair trade cases is itself prima facie
evidence of their use for harassment of successful foreign suppliers”. Kenen
(2000, p. 231) observes in his textbook “The rule against dumping has thus
become a popular route for domestic ﬁrms to obtain protection against im-
port competition”. In the present article we provide a simple game theoretic
argument in order to support this view. We argue for a diﬀerent deﬁnition
of costs if eﬃciency and fairness are the aims of the WTO.3
Article VI of the General Agreement on Tariﬀs and Trade (GATT)4 states
that a country may use anti-dumping measures if a “product is ... introduced
1“Seeds sown for future growth”, The Economist, 15th of November 2001.
2Stiglitz (2000, p. 439) writes ”Nowhere is this hypocrisy greater than in the invocation
of anti-dumping and countervailing duties”. He also reports an episode where the U.S.
government was threatening to invoke dumping duties on Russia’s exports of aluminium,
where both parties knew that Russia was not dumping.
3We side again with Stiglitz (1997), who comes to a similar conclusion, arguing for the
use of marginal as opposed to average cost if fair trade and measures against predatory
pricing are the policy concern.
4All legal texts can be downloaded from the WTO-webpages: http://www.wto.org .
2into the commerce of an importing country at less than its normal value”.
The GATT provides two alternative deﬁnitions of the normal value. First,
if the product is sold on the exporting country’s market too, then the nor-
mal price is “the comparable price, in the ordinary course of trade for the
like product when destined for consumption in the exporting country”. Sec-
ond, if the product is not considered to be sold on the exporting country’s
market, the ﬁnal act of the Uruguay Round, the Agreement on Implementa-
tion of Article VI (1994) deﬁnes the normal price in the “ordinary course of
trade” as at least the price covering “per unit (ﬁxed and variable) costs plus
administrative, selling and general costs”. Hence a normal price is a price
that is equal to, or higher than the price on the exporting country’s market,
o rt h ea v e r a g ec o s t sp l u s-i nb o t hc a s e s-e x p e n s e sf o rt r a n s p o r t a t i o na n d
administration.
Our argument is based on the second (average cost) deﬁnition. The lit-
erature also states the average cost deﬁnition as the one predominantly used
in anti-dumping cases (see for example Stiglitz, 1997). In footnotes we refer
to the ﬁrst deﬁnition and show that the results are equivalent. For our argu-
ment the average cost deﬁnition is the less distorting one because an entrant
can use home market prices to ﬁnance part of the transportation costs. If in
our model an ineﬃciency arises under the average cost deﬁnition it will also
arise under the stricter home market price deﬁnition.
We present a simple game theoretic model of international trade. Two
ﬁrms display economies of scale in the production of one homogeneous good.
Firms are located in diﬀerent countries. Each country exhibits inelastic de-
mand for the good. Firms compete in prices. Without the application of the
anti-dumping rule, economies of scale in production imply that production is
concentrated in one of the countries, given transportation costs are not too
large. In equilibrium, both markets are served by the globally more eﬃcient
producer. For some non-empty parameter ranges equilibrium prices violate
Article VI. If the anti-dumping rule restricts the set of actions (prices) avail-
able to players (ﬁrms) then a diﬀerent equilibrium set results. In particular
3for some parameter values one country produces always if the rule is not
applied. However if the rule is enforced the same parameter values yield
equilibria where either one or the other country produces and sells on the
global market. In these “both may produce” equilibria it is possible that the
less eﬃcient producer sells on both markets.
T h ea r g u m e n ts t a t e ds of a ri sb a s e do nas i m u l t a n e o u sm o v e( n o r m a l
form) game. Most industries are characterized by incumbents, usually lo-
cated in industrialized countries, and entrants, usually located in emerging
economies. To accommodate for this sequential structure, we study the game
with a sequence of moves, with the incumbent moving ﬁrst. To capture a
ﬁrst mover advantage we apply subgame perfection as a selection criterion
among existing Nash equilibria. Of the “both may produce” equilibria of
the normal form game under the anti-dumping rule, only those are subgame
perfect where the incumbent serves the global market. The entrant can only
serve the global market if his eﬃciency advantage is large enough, such that
in the normal form game only equilibria exist where the entrant produces.
Article VI forces him to cover fully the transportation costs by the revenue
from sales in the foreign market.
In contrast to Brander and Spencer (1985) or Bagwell and Staiger (1997)
this paper does not consider strategic trade policy by governments. Bagwell
and Staiger use a related model to study the competition of ﬁrms displaying
economies of scale in production and the eﬀect of export subsidies by gov-
ernments. In contrast to the results of Brander and Spencer, Bagwell and
Staiger show that such subsidies can be eﬃciency enhancing. In their model,
not allowing for subsidies reduces eﬃciency because the contest of two coun-
tries in granting such subsidies results in the more eﬃcient producer winning
the entire market. Subsidies, as considered by both contributions provide
a rationale for the WTO’s anti-dumping rule. We want to emphasize the
presumingly unwanted eﬀe c t so ft h ef o r m u l a t i o no ft h er u l e .
The article proceeds by stating the model in section 2. Section 3 derives
results. Section 4 draws some conclusions.
42T h e M o d e l
The model considers one period only. Two ﬁrms are located in two diﬀerent
countries, one industrialized (or incumbent) and one emerging (or entrant)
country. The countries are denoted by I and E respectively. Both ﬁrms use
technologies exhibiting economies of scale to produce a homogenous good.
In each country the industry is represented by one (potential) ﬁrm. The two
ﬁrms compete in prices (Bertrand), in a contestable market fashion. In a
related multi period game this rules out that an entrant can be deterred from
becoming active in any future period by an action chosen by the incumbent
today.
Demand in each country is price inelastic and given by xE and xI.5 We
assume markets to be segmented, i.e. ﬁrms can price discriminate between
markets. Denote by X = xE + xI the total (global) demand for the good.
The production technologies are described by per-unit or average costs.
These per-unit costs diﬀer for countries and exhibit economies of scale, where
ci(x),i∈ {I;E} represents per-unit (average) costs of the ﬁrm in country i.
In order to model economies of scale in production we assume that ci(x)
is a function with the properties ∂ci/∂x<0 and ci(0) = 0, where x is the
quantity produced. For the simple case of constant marginal costs this is
ci(x)=F i/x+e ci for x>0 and ci(x =0 )=0 ,w h e r eF i for instance captures
diﬀerences in setup and labor force training costs in both countries and e ci
denotes marginal costs - which might include diﬀerences in variable resource
costs or labor costs. Fixed costs are only incurred if production takes place.
An example of constant marginal costs is provided to illustrate parameter
ranges where multiple equilibria exist.
Finally transaction costs of selling one unit of the good in the other
country are constant and equal to t. They are independent of the direction
of trade. t represents transportation as well as administrative and adaptation
5The assumption of inelastic demand simpliﬁes greatly the calculations. It does not
aﬀect the basic argument that Article VI restricts the strategy set of the ﬁrms and thus
can alter the equilibrium set of the game.
5costs.
We assume price competition. Total demand in each country is allocated
to the producer with the lower per unit price. The price charged in each
market will be the lowest price that the high cost producer can oﬀer without
making negative proﬁts.6 In the literature this type of competition is also
referred to as a contestable market game (as introduced by Baumol, Panzar
and Willig, 1982). The actions available to players are the prices p
j
i,w h e r e
the lower index i denotes the country of the producer, and the upper index
j denotes the market where the good is sold.
Let p1 ¹ p2 (º) denote that p1 ≤ p2 (p1 ≥ p2) and for p1 = p2 producer
1 (2) is able to choose a lower price without making a loss. The table below
states the market outcomes resulting from the strategies (prices) chosen by
E,I.








I (1) only I produces (3) cross hauling only
pE
E ¹ pE
I (2) no trade (4) only E produces
In case (1) E does not enter the market, the payoﬀsa r e0 for E and
(pE
I − t − cI(X))xE +( pI
I − cE(X))xI for I. Case (2) describes a situation
where each ﬁrm serves its home market only, payoﬀsa r e(pE
E−cE(xE))xE and
(pI
I − cI(xI))xI for E,I respectively. In case (3) both ﬁrms serve the other
market only, payoﬀsa r e(pI
E −t−cE(xI))xI and (pI
E −t−cI(xE))xE for E,I
respectively. Note, that this can never be an equilibrium because, due to the
economies of scale, competing for the global market is always more proﬁtable
than competing for the foreign market only. Case (4) describes a situation,
where E serves the global market and gets a payoﬀ of (pE
E − cE(X))xE +
(pI
E − t − cE(X))xI whereas I gets 0.
6cf. Tirole (1988) on Bertrand competition with asymmetric costs or limit pricing.
6In the equilibria speciﬁed below it will be stated which country produces
for given parameters. As a consequence of the assumption of inelastic de-
mand the equilibrium may not be unique in prices. Multiple equilibria with
respect to prices exist whenever one ﬁrm produces for both markets and the
most competitive option of the (non producing) competitor is to produce for
both markets. In equilibrium, the competitors oﬀer the same prices but the
producing ﬁrm generates a positive proﬁt whereas the competitor’s proﬁta t
these prices is zero. For all prices in the equilibrium set the proﬁts of both
ﬁrms are the same. To be speciﬁc, consider one equilibrium with prices pI
and pE and with country I producing. If the E producer is at these prices in-
diﬀerent between entering the global market (both markets) and not entering
at all then prices pI +∆I and pE −∆E with ∆E = xI
xE∆I are also equilibrium
prices as long as pE − ∆E ≤ cE(xE). The latter inequality ensures that the
producer in E cannot compete by serving the home market only.
In order to analyze Article VI, we model the anti-dumping rule by a
restriction on the action set of players: The action sets are restricted with
respect to the pricing on the foreign market such that pE
I ≥ cI(X)+t and
pI
E ≥ cE(X)+t.7 In equilibrium each country cannot reduce any of its prices
without making a loss. When the anti-dumping rule is applied, prices are
not allowed to violate the restriction.
We ﬁrst consider a simultaneous move (normal form) game. In this basic
setup we search for Nash equilibria. We subsequently extend the analysis
and analyze a game with sequential moves where the incumbent moves ﬁrst
followed by the entrant. In this extension we use subgame perfection as the
equilibrium concept.
3R e s u l t s
In this section we ﬁrst state the results with and without the Article VI
restriction. At the end of the section two diagrams summarize and illustrate
7Or pF
C ≥ pC
C + t as the constraint for the alternative deﬁnition.
7the intuition behind the results.
In what follows, we denote by the index C the producing country and by
the index F the competing country (from the perspective of the producing
country the foreign country).
If the action set is unrestricted, producers are free to choose their pair of
prices. In our model without anti-dumping policies there exist only equilibria
where the more eﬃcient producer sells on both markets, given t is not too
large. Production takes place exclusively in either E or in I.
Proposition 1 Without anti-dumping policies there exist only equilibria where
the producer with the lowest overall costs (min{XcE(X)+txI,Xc I(X)+txE})
serves the global market.
Proof. We stated above that the equilibrium is not unique in prices. Given
the multiplicity of equilibria in prices, we prove the equilibrium for one set
of prices. The other equilibria can be derived from the above mentioned
argument. Consider the equilibrium where pF




xCcF(xF)+t. The latter price results from the zero proﬁt condition for F on
the global market given pF
C. These prices generate a proﬁto fxF(pF
C−cC(X))+
xC(pC
C − cC(X)) = xF(cF(xF) − cC(X) − t))+ XcF(X) − xFcF(xF)+txC −
xCcC(X)=−XcC(X) − xFt + XcF(X)+xCt>0 given XcF(X)+txC >
XcC(X)+txF. Hence if C has the lower overall costs then in any Nash
equilibrium C is the actual producer. C is able to reduce prices slightly
further without making a loss.
The proposition states that one country always produces and this coun-
try is the one with the lower overall costs for serving the global market. The
overall costs consist of total production costs and the transportation costs
to the foreign country. However, note that for some parameter values the
producing ﬁrm sells below “the price in the ordinary course of trade”. The
producing ﬁrm has to do this in equilibrium to keep the competitor indiﬀer-
e n tb e t w e e ne n t e r i n gt h eg l o b a lm a r k e ta n dn o te n t e r i n ga ta l l .T h ep r i c e s
charged on the foreign market show a discount on average (plus transaction)
8costs. But, prices show no discount on marginal costs, which are lower due to
economies of scale. Marginal costs are the important benchmark if predatory
pricing and eﬃciency in general are the objectives. Selling below average plus
transportation costs can be eﬃcient and proﬁtable for the actual producer.
In models of spatial price discrimination such behavior is frequently observed
and is referred to as base point pricing (see for example Haddock (1982)) .
Let us now turn to the eﬀects of the anti-dumping rule. Only prices on
the foreign market that fulﬁll the WTO restriction: pF
C ≥ cC(X)+t can be
chosen.8 It needs to be stressed, that the WTO restriction reduces the action
sets of players, which implies that the most competitive oﬀer of one player
may not be an element of his action set.
First, we characterize a situation that might have been the aim of Article
VI, the protection of (small) domestic industries against (large) international
competitors, which may not be more eﬃcient overall. The following propo-
sition describes a situation where both ﬁrms produce.
Proposition 2 Given the anti-dumping rule only an equilibrium without
trade exists, where both countries produce for their home market, if and only
if cI(X)+t ≥ cE(xE) and cE(X)+t ≥ cI(xI).
Proof. If both conditions hold then each producer can underbid the best
price the competitor can oﬀer under the Article VI restriction when he pro-
duces for his home market only.
Under the conditions stated, Article VI generates equilibria with eﬃ-
cient production whenever min{XcI(X)+xEt,XcE(X)+xIt} >x EcE(xE)+
xIcI(xI). If the opposite holds then the WTO rule is welfare decreasing.
Without the anti-dumping rule Proposition 1 states that the producer with
the lower overall costs will serve the global market.
The next proposition characterizes equilibria where production is concen-
trated in one country and the anti-dumping rule has to be observed.
8The alternative constraint pF
C ≥ pC
C + t is equivalent if the constraint is binding.
Combining pF
C = pC
C + t with the no loss requirement in equilibrium (pF
CxF + pC
CxC ≥
Xc(X)+txF) yields the same restriction as the one given in the text.
9Proposition 3 Given the anti-dumping rule only equilibria exist where the
industrialized [emerging] country only produces if cI(X)+t<c E(X) [cE(X)+
t<c I(X)].
Proof. If one of the inequalities hold then the producer with the lower costs
can underbid the competitor in both countries and can do so with prices that
fulﬁll the WTO restriction.
Again, due to the assumption of inelastic demand, prices in equilibrium
are not unique . Prices have the same structure as stated above. In any case,
under the conditions stated in Proposition 3 it is possible for the producer
to oﬀer prices above per unit costs of production plus transportation costs
avoiding the possibility of anti-dumping measures.
The interesting cases are the remaining range of cost parameters. For
these parameters, in the existing equilibria either E or I produces. This
multiplicity only arises if selling below average plus transportation costs, is
ruled out due to anti-dumping legislation.
Proposition 4 Given the anti-dumping rule there exist equilibria where ei-
ther production takes place in I only or it takes place in E only if and only if
max{cI(X),c E(X)} < min{cI(X),c E(X)}+t and max{cI(X),c E(X)}+t<
min{cI(xI),c E(xE)}.
Proof. Consider the following equilibrium pF = pF
C = cF(xF) and pC =
pC
C = cF(X)+t. At these prices F cannot reduce prices further without
violating the WTO restriction or generating a loss. Under the conditions
stated in the proposition C generates a proﬁto fxF(cF(xF) − cC(X) − t)+
xC(cF(X)+t−cC(X)). This proﬁt is greater than zero given that both cost
diﬀerences are positive. Under the conditions stated in the proposition this
holds for C = I and C = E.T h eﬁrst condition ensures that the case stated
in the previous proposition does not apply. The second condition ensures
that the lowest costs (cC(X)) of both countries allows each ﬁrm to underbid
the best price the other ﬁrm can oﬀer when producing for its home market
only (cF(xF)). The opposite case was described in Proposition 2 .
10To reconsider the alternative deﬁnition of dumping, note that the assump-
tion stated in the proposition also guarantees that the proposed equilibrium
prices fulﬁll the foreign price deﬁnition9.
We now consider the game with sequential moves. First I sets prices and
then E. In the previous proposition we characterized parameter ranges such
that in equilibrium only I or only E produces. Subgame perfection selects
among the multiple equilibria of the game. The fact that the ﬁrm producing
makes a positive proﬁt, implies:
Proposition 5 In all subgame perfect equilibria for the parameters charac-
t e r i z e di nP r o p o s i t i o n4o n l yI produces.
Proof. The WTO restriction does not allow the second mover to underbid
the ﬁrst mover on his home market. Given that the producing ﬁrm generates
ap r o ﬁt implies that I in equilibrium sets the prices pE = cE(xE) and pI =
cE(X)+t and serves the global market.
This result shows that the WTO rule favors incumbents. Given that the
cut oﬀ value given in Proposition 1 is contained in the interval described by
Proposition 4 it follows that the WTO rule can lead to an incumbent from
one (industrialized) country serving the global market, even if production is
globally more eﬃcient if it takes place in the other (emerging) country. These
considerations are illustrated by the following two ﬁgures.
Figure 1 is based on an example of ﬁxed plus constant marginal costs.
We assume that the I country has an advantage due to lower ﬁxed costs
(F E >F I)w h e r e a sE has an advantage in variable costs (w = cI − cE > 0
for example due to per unit wage diﬀerences). We additionally assume that
FI
xI +w>FE
X +t to ensure that both countries are able to obey the WTO rule
and underbid a competitor producing for his home market only. In ﬁgure 1
the ﬁrm which produces in the absence of an anti-dumping rule is represented
9The alternative deﬁnition of dumping implies the following has to hold in equilibrium:
pF = cF(xF) ≥ cF(X)+t = pC. For both countries the second assumption stated in
the proposition guarantees that cC(xC) >c C(X)+t, hence equilibrium prices always
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below the line. If the anti-dumping rule applies a region around the point
where total costs, covering production and transportation costs, are equal
for both producers exists. In this region there exist Nash equilibria of the
normal form game where either only I or only E produces. In the subgame
perfect equilibria of the game with sequential moves, I as the ﬁrm moving
ﬁrst, serves the global market. In this case, it is possible that in equilibrium
the less eﬃcient producer can sell on both markets, due to the anti-dumping
rule and economies of scale in production.
The next example does not rely on a simple cost structure. Figure 2
illustrates a case where the entrant in a situation without an anti-dumping
rule serves the global market at foreign prices below the normal value because
h i so v e r a l lc o s t sa r el o w e s t( cE(X)+xI
X t<c I(X)+xE
X t). At the same
time multiple equilibria exist when the anti-dumping rule applies because
the incumbent can set prices below cE(X)+t such that the entrant cannot
use his most competitive oﬀer. Due to the production technologies and the
home market eﬀect the incumbent needs not to violate Article VI. In this
case cI(X) may be larger than cE(X) and it is still possible that equilibria
in the simultaneous move game where either I or E produces exist. In a
sequential move game, producer I simply reduces his home market price to
obey the anti-dumping rule on the foreign market.
To exploit the comparative statics of the equilibrium we observe the fol-
12c
E(X)+(x
I/X)t     c
I(X)+(x
E/X)t        c
E(X)    c
I(X)       c
E(X)+t     c
I(X)+t     c
I(x
I)     c
E(x
E)       
/
                               
     
 





Figure 2: A generalized example where the anti-dumping rule leads to the
less eﬃcient producer serving the global market.
lowing. The smaller t is compared to the extent of economies of scale, the
more likely it is that trade takes place. From an entrant’s point of view (if
he is located in the economy with the smaller demand), this has two positive
eﬀects. On the one hand the home market eﬀect (favoring the economy with
the larger demand) becomes less strong without anti-dumping policies. On
the other hand the range of parameter values increases where an entrant can
underbid the incumbent without violating anti-dumping rules. However the
home market eﬀect alone does not yield the same result. The ineﬃciency
results from the use of an average cost instead of a marginal cost deﬁnition
in the formulation of the anti-dumping rule. A larger home market reduces
the average cost bias, it does not make it disappear.
The disadvantage due to the anti-dumping rule may be relatively small,
especially if the home market of the emerging economy is small. But, in mar-
kets where cost diﬀerences in production are small, this small eﬀect may turn
the weights towards an incumbent. Furthermore, not all emerging economies
have homemarkets that are small, examples being Poland or South Africa.
In such cases the eﬀect of the anti-dumping legislation can be quite strong.
4C o n c l u s i o n
In this article, we highlighted in a simple model of international trade the
protection of incumbents by the WTO’s anti-dumping rule. Incumbent ﬁrms
of industries that show economies of scale in production are usually located
in industrialized countries. The anti-dumping rule hence protects industri-
13alized economies from competition by emerging economies. In the model
presented, the rule makes emerging countries, usually already in a disadvan-
tageous position due to a smaller home market even worse oﬀ.
Anti-dumping measures have to be declared to the WTO. Looking at
WTO data on anti-dumping measures initiated or in action reveals that it is
mainly industrialized that countries use this instrument. Anti-dumping rules
are more often applied by developed than by developing WTO member coun-
tries. The European Union (160) and the United States of America (185)
have especially high numbers of anti-dumping actions in force (only India
has a similar number of actions in place). In general, the developed mem-
bers of the WTO have on average close to forty measures in place whereas
the developing and transition members have an average below thirty. Only
thirty percent of all measures in force are against producers from developed
countries whereas developing and transition countries carry the burden of
the remaining 70%.10
Another empirical observation supports the view that Article VI is used as
a protection device for domestic ﬁrms in developed countries against compe-
tition from abroad. Thurow (1985) shows that 18 out of 20 top Fortune 5000
ﬁrms in the United States could be accused of dumping if the anti-dumping
laws were applied domestically.
So, why do countries not oppose more strongly against Article VI? One
explanation could be that in the lobbying process entrants are usually not
present or have little power. In this case governments are inﬂuenced more by
incumbents. If few incumbents exist in emerging economies as well they will
lobby for the adoption of Article VI. The government, inﬂuenced by lobbying,
will accept the agreement even though it puts the emerging economy at a
disadvantage. Stiglitz (2000) reports that developing countries too, learned
to use Article VI to protect local industries..
The discussions of the Doha round and the Cancun Ministerial Conference
10The data can be found on the WTO’s webpages: www.wto.org. The presented data
is as of the end of 2002.
14reveal that more countries realize negative eﬀects of some WTO rules. And
certainly there are more complains and failures than the one discussed in this
article.
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